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STATE OF U T A H 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DEC 0 2 2008 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE T> * *• rr,. r n .. ,.• v KIRK TORGENSEN 
chief Deputy Protecting Utah • Protecting You
 Chief Deputy 
December 2, 2008 
Ms. Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk 
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State v. Dennis Rosa-Re, Case No. 20060432-CA 
Rule 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
On November 24, 2008, oral argument in the above case occurred before Judges 
Bench, Davis, and McHugh. 
During argument, I represented that a deferential clear error standard applies in 
reviewing a trial court's ruling (step three) on a Bats on objection. See also Brief of Appellee 
at 1-2 & 32-35. In rebuttal, defense counsel stated that the Supreme Court refused to apply 
a deferential standard in Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008). That statement does 
not fairly characterize Snyder. 
In Snyder, the Court applied a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to the trial 
court's ruling. Id. at 1206. The Court explained: 
On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be 
sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. The trial court has a pivotal role in 
evaluating Bats on claims. Step three of the Bats on inquiry involves an 
evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, and the best evidence of 
discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises 
the challenge. In addition, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges 
often invoke a juror's demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the 
trial court's first-hand observations of even greater importance. In this 
situation, the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor's 
demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demeanor 
can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the 
juror by the prosecutor. 
Id. at 1207-08 (citations and internal marks omitted). 
The Court recognized that only under "exceptional circumstances" should a trial 
court's assessment be rejected. Id. at 1208. The Court then found such circumstances where 
(1) an extensive colloquy with the stricken juror belied one of the prosecutor's two 
explanations for the strike, (2) the Batson objection was summarily rejected without 
explanation or indication as to which of the prosecutor's two explanations the trial court 
credited, and (3) the prosecutor otherwise injected race into the capital murder trial. Snyder, 
128 S. Ct. at 1208-09. See also State's Supplemental Letter, dated September 9,2008 (with 
Snyder opinion attached). 
Thank you for your prompt distribution of this letter to the panel judges. 
Sincerely, 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Linda M. Jones 
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Ms. Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
Re: State v. Rosa-Re, Case No. 20060432. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Dennis Rosa-Re 
notifies the Utah Court of Appeals of the following pertinent and significant authority: 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008) (attached hereto). 
On March 28, 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Snyder v. Louisiana, 
128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008), that a prosecutor's reasons for striking a veniremember from the jury 
panel constituted discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky ^  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
Snyder pertains to points argued in this case concerning the prosecutor's reasons for striking 
veniremembers from the jury panel, and it pertains to review on appeal of the trial court's 
ruling. (See Brief of Appellant, dated August 18, 2006, Arguments B. and C, pages 14-18, 
20-23,27-30). 
Respectfully yours, 
Linda M. Jones 
Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused an original and 7 copies of 
the foregoing to be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 4 copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. 
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854, this~3_ day of September, 2008. 
LIN0A M. JONES 
Delivered this day of September, 2008. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal, 
^Snyder v. Louisiana 
U.S.La.,2008. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Allen SNYDER, Petitioner, 
v. 
LOUISIANA 
No. 06-10119. 
Argued Dec. 4, 2007. 
Decided March 19, 2008. 
Background: Defendant was convicted 
in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Parish of Jefferson, Kernan A. 
Hand, J., of first-degree murder and was 
sentenced to death. Defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court Of Louisiana, 874 
So.2d 739, affirmed. Granting 
defendant's petition for a writ of 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, 545 U.S. 
1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d 884, 
vacated the judgment and remanded for 
further consideration. On remand, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 942 So.2d 
484, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Justice 
Alito, held that prosecutor's proffered 
reasons for striking black prospective 
juror were pretext for racial 
discrimination. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented and filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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HI Jury 230 €^33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
23011 Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
Batson provides a three-step process for a 
trial court to use in adjudicating a claim 
that a peremptory challenge was based on 
race: (1) a defendant must make a prima 
facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis 
of race; (2) if that showing has been 
made, the prosecution must offer a 
race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question; and (3) in light of the parties' 
submissions, the trial court must 
determine whether the defendant has 
shown purposeful discrimination. 
12] Criminal Law 110 €^>H58.17 
110 Criminal Law 
llOXXIV Review 
HOXXIV(O) Questions of Fact 
and Findings 
110kll58.17 k. Jury Selection. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Okl 158(3)) 
On appeal of Batson claim, a trial court's 
ruling on the issue of discriminatory 
intent must be sustained unless it is 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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clearly erroneous. 
131 Jury 230 €>>33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
Step three of the Batson inquiry involves 
an evaluation of the prosecutor's 
credibility, and the best evidence of 
discriminatory intent often will be the 
demeanor of the attorney who exercises 
the challenge. 
Injury 230 0^33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
In evaluating Batson claims, race-neutral 
reasons for peremptory challenges often 
invoke a juror's demeanor, such as 
nervousness or inattention, making the 
trial court's first-hand observations of 
even greater importance. 
151 Jury 230 €^>33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
In evaluating Batson claims, the trial 
court must evaluate not only whether the 
prosecutor's demeanor belies a 
discriminatory intent, but also whether 
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said 
to have exhibited the basis for the strike 
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. 
161 Jury 230 €^33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
Prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking 
black prospective juror in capital murder 
trial, that prospective juror was nervous 
during voir dire and that he might have 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 USLW 4136, 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3043, 2008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3757 
been motivated to find defendant guilty of 
lesser included offense to obviate the 
need for a penalty phase and thereby 
minimize the student teaching hours he 
would miss, were pretext for racial 
discrimination; prospective juror, after 
being informed during voir dire that the 
court had contacted his dean, who 
informed the court that he would work 
with the prospective juror to see that he 
was able to make up any student-teaching 
time that he missed due to jury service, 
did not express any further concern about 
serving on the jury, prosecutor had 
anticipated on the record during voir dire 
that trial would be brief, trial and penalty 
phase were completed two days after 
prospective juror was struck, and 
prosecutor accepted white jurors who 
disclosed conflicting obligations that 
were at least as serious as black 
prospective juror. 
121 Criminal Law 110 €^1134.38 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXIVfL) Scope of Review in 
General 
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry 
110kll34.38 k. 
Summoning, Impaneling, or Selection of 
Jury. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Okl 134(5)) 
Jury 230 €^33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of 
Right 
230k33 Constitution and 
Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and 
Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. 
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited 
Cases 
In considering a Batson objection, or in 
reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson 
error, all of the circumstances that bear 
upon the issue of racial animosity must be 
consulted. 
*1204 Syllabus ml 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no 
part of the opinion of the Court but 
has been prepared by the Reporter 
of Decisions for the convenience 
of the reader. See United States v. 
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 
U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 
L.Ed. 499. 
During voir dire in petitioner's capital 
murder case, the prosecutor used 
peremptory strikes to eliminate black 
prospective jurors who had survived 
challenges for cause. The jury convicted 
petitioner and sentenced him to death. 
Both on direct appeal and on remand in 
light ofMiller-Elv. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 
125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected 
petitioner's claim that the prosecution's 
peremptory strikes of certain prospective 
jurors, including Mr. Brooks, were based 
on race, in violation of Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal. 
90 L.Ed.2d 69. 
Held: The trial judge committed clear 
error in rejecting the Batson objection to 
the strike of Mr. Brooks. Pp. 1207 - 1212. 
(a) Under Batson's three-step process for 
adjudicating claims such as petitioner's, 
(1) a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that the challenge was based on 
race; (2) if so, " 'the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the 
juror in question5 "; and (3) " 'in light of 
the parties' submissions, the trial court 
must determine whether the defendant 
has shown purposeful discrimination.' 
" Miller-El supra at 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting 
*1205Miller- El v. Cockrell 537 U.S. 
322. 328-329, 123 S.Ct 1029, 154 
L.Ed.2d 931). Unless it is clearly 
erroneous, the trial court's ruling must be 
sustained on appeal. The trial court's role 
is pivotal, for it must evaluate the 
demeanor of the prosecutor exercising the 
challenge and the juror being excluded. 
Pp. 1207 - 1208. 
(b) While all of the circumstances bearing 
on the racial-animosity issue must be 
consulted in considering a Batson 
objection or reviewing a ruling claimed to 
be a Batson error, the explanation given 
for striking Mr. Brooks, a college senior 
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching 
obligation, is insufficient by itself and 
suffices for a Batson error determination. 
Pp. 1208-1212. 
(1) It cannot be presumed that the trial 
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court credited the prosecution's first 
race-neutral reason, that Mr. Brooks 
looked nervous. Deference is owed to a 
trial judge's finding that an attorney 
credibly relied on demeanor in exercising 
a strike, but here, the trial judge simply 
allowed the challenge without 
explanation. Since Mr. Brooks was not 
challenged until the day after he was 
questioned and thus after dozens of other 
jurors had been called, the judge might 
not have recalled his demeanor. Or he 
may have found such consideration 
unnecessary, instead basing his ruling on 
the second proffered reason for the strike. 
Pp. 1208 - 1209. 
(2) That reason-Mr. Brooks' 
student-teaching obligation-fails even 
under the highly deferential standard of 
review applicable here. Mr. Brooks was 1 
of more than 50 venire members 
expressing concern that jury service or 
sequestration would interfere with work, 
school, family, or other obligations. 
Although he was initially concerned 
about making up lost teaching time, he 
expressed no further concern once a law 
clerk reported that the school's dean 
would work with Mr. Brooks if he missed 
time for a trial that week, and the 
prosecutor did not question him more 
deeply about the matter. The proffered 
reason must be evaluated in light of the 
circumstances that the colloquy and law 
clerk report took place on Tuesday, the 
prosecution struck Mr. Brooks on 
Wednesday, the trial's guilt phase ended 
on Thursday, and its penalty phase ended 
on Friday. The prosecutor's scenario-that 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal. 
Mr. Brooks would have been inclined to 
find petitioner guilty of a lesser included 
offense to obviate the need for a penalty 
phase-is both highly speculative and 
unlikely. Mr. Brooks would be in a 
position to shorten the trial only if most or 
all of the jurors had favored a lesser 
verdict. Perhaps most telling, the trial's 
brevity, which the prosecutor anticipated 
on the record during voir dire, meant that 
jury service would not have seriously 
interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to 
complete his student teaching. The dean 
offered to work with him, and the trial 
occurred relatively early in the fall term, 
giving Mr. Brooks several weeks to make 
up the time. The implausibility of the 
prosecutor's explanation is reinforced by 
his acceptance of white jurors who 
disclosed conflicting obligations that 
appear to have been at least as serious as 
Mr. Brooks'. Under Batsoris third stage, 
the prosecution's pretextual explanation 
gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory intent. There is no need to 
decide here whether, in Batson cases, 
once a discriminatory intent is shown to 
be a motivating factor, the burden shifts 
to the prosecution to show that the 
discriminatory factor was not 
determinative. It is enough to recognize 
that a peremptory strike shown to have 
been motivated in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent could not be 
sustained based on any lesser showing by 
the prosecution. The record here does not 
show that the prosecution would have 
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks 
based on his nervousness alone, *1206 
and there is no realistic possibility that the 
Page 5 
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subtle question of causation could be 
profitably explored further on remand 
more than a decade after petitioner's trial. 
Pp. 1208 - 1212. 
942 So.2d 484, reversed and remanded. 
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and 
STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, 
G1NSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. 
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which SCALIA, J., joined. 
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel of Record, 
Southern Center for Human Rights, 
Atlanta, Georgia, Jelpi P. Picou, Jr., 
Marcia Widder, Capital Appeals Project, 
New Orleans, Louisiana, for Petitioner. 
Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, 
Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana, 
Terry M. Boudreaux, Counsel of Record, 
Assistant District Attorney, Gretna, 
Louisiana, for Respondent.For U.S. 
Supreme Court briefs, see:2007 WL 
2605447 (Pet.Brief)2007 WL 3307731 
(Resp .Brief)2007 WL 4218010 
(Reply .Brief) 
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
Petitioner Allen Snyder was convicted of 
first-degree murder in a Louisiana court 
and was sentenced to death. He asks us to 
review a decision of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court rejecting his claim that 
the prosecution exercised some of its 
peremptory jury challenges based on 
race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 USLW4136, 08 Cal. 
69 (1986). We hold that the trial court 
committed clear error in its ruling on a 
Batson objection, and we therefore 
reverse. 
I 
The crime for which petitioner was 
convicted occurred in August 1995. At 
that time, petitioner and his wife, Mary, 
had separated. On August 15, they 
discussed the possibility of reconciliation, 
and Mary agreed to meet with petitioner 
the next day. That night, Mary went on a 
date with Howard Wilson. During the 
evening, petitioner repeatedly attempted 
to page Mary, but she did not respond. At 
approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 16, 
Wilson drove up to the home of Maryfs 
mother to drop Mary off. Petitioner was 
waiting at the scene armed with a knife. 
He opened the driver's side door of 
Wilson's car and repeatedly stabbed the 
occupants, killing Wilson and wounding 
Mary. 
The State charged petitioner with 
first-degree murder and sought the death 
penalty based on the aggravating 
circumstance that petitioner had 
knowingly created a risk of death or great 
bodily harm to more than one person. See 
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 
905.4(A)(4) (West Supp.2008). 
Voir dire began on Tuesday, August 27, 
1996, and proceeded as follows. During 
the first phase, the trial court screened the 
panel to identify jurors who did not meet 
Louisiana's requirements for jury service 
Page 6 
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or claimed that service on the jury or 
sequestration for the duration of the trial 
would result in extreme hardship. More 
than 50 prospective jurors reported that 
they had work, family, or other 
commitments that would interfere with 
jury service. In each of those instances, 
the nature of the conflicting commitments 
was explored, and some of these jurors 
were dismissed. App. 58-164. 
In the next phase, the court randomly 
selected panels of 13 potential jurors for 
*1207 further questioning. Id., at 
166-167. The defense and prosecution 
addressed each panel and questioned the 
jurors both as a group and individually. 
At the conclusion of this questioning, the 
court ruled on challenges for cause. Then, 
the prosecution and the defense were 
given the opportunity to use peremptory 
challenges (each side had 12) to remove 
remaining jurors. The court continued 
this process of calling 13-person panels 
until the jury was filled. In accordance 
with Louisiana law, the parties were 
permitted to exercise "backstrikes." That 
is, they were allowed to use their 
peremptories up until the time when the 
final jury was sworn and thus were 
permitted to strike jurors whom they had 
initially accepted when the jurors' panels 
were called. See La. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann., Art. 795(b)(1); State v. Taylor, 
93-2201, pp. 22-23 (La.2/28/96), 669 
So.2d 364, 376. 
Eighty-five prospective jurors were 
questioned as members of a panel. 
Thirty-six of these survived challenges 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal. 
for cause; 5 of the 36 were black; and all 5 
of the prospective black jurors were 
eliminated by the prosecution through the 
use of peremptory strikes. The jury found 
petitioner guilty of first-degree murder 
and determined that he should receive the 
death penalty. 
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court conditionally affirmed petitioner's 
conviction. The court rejected petitioner's 
Batson claim but remanded the case for a 
nunc pro tunc determination of 
petitioner's competency to stand trial. 
State v. Snyder. 98-1078 (La.4/14/99), 
750 So.2d 832. Two justices dissented 
and would have found a Batson violation. 
See id., at 866 (Johnson, J., dissenting), 
863 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
On remand, the trial court found that 
petitioner had been competent to stand 
trial, and the Louisiana Supreme Court 
affirmed that determination. State v. 
Snyder. 1998-1078 (La.4/14/04), 874 
So.2d 739. Petitioner petitioned this 
Court for a writ of certiorari, and while 
his petition was pending, this Court 
decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 
231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 
(2005). We then granted the petition, 
vacated the judgment, and remanded the 
case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for 
further consideration in light of 
Miller-El See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 
U.S. 1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d 
884 (2005). On remand, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court again rejected Snyder's 
Batson claim, this time by a vote of 4 to 3. 
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See 1998-1078 (La.9/6/06), 942 So.2d 
484. We again granted certiorari, 551 
U.S. — , 127 S.Ct. 3004. 168 L.Ed.2d 
726 (2007), and now reverse. 
II 
[1] Batson provides a three-step process 
for a trial court to use in adjudicating a 
claim that a peremptory challenge was 
based on race: 
" 'First, a defendant must make a prima 
facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the 
basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing 
has been made, the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the 
juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of 
the parties' submissions, the trial court 
must determine whether the defendant 
has shown purposeful discrimination.' 
" Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at 277[, 
125 S.Ct. 23171 (THOMAS, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-329L 123 
S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 9311 (2003)). 
r21[3ir41|"51 On appeal, a trial court's 
ruling on the issue of discriminatory 
intent must be sustained unless it is 
clearly erroneous. See Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 
114L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)^1208 (plurality 
opinion); id, at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1859 
(O'Connor, J., joined by SCALIA, J., 
concurring in judgment). The trial court 
has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson 
claims. Step three of the Batson inquiry 
involves an evaluation of the prosecutor's 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
128 S.Ct. 1203 
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175,16 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal. 
credibility, see 476 U.S., at 98, n. 21, 106 
S.Ct. 1712, and "the best evidence [of 
discriminatory intent] often will be the 
demeanor of the attorney who exercises 
the challGngz^Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 
365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plurality opinion). 
In addition, race-neutral reasons for 
peremptory challenges often invoke a 
juror's demeanor (e.g., nervousness, 
inattention), making the trial court's 
first-hand observations of even greater 
importance. In this situation, the trial 
court must evaluate not only whether the 
prosecutor's demeanor belies a 
discriminatory intent, but also whether 
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said 
to have exhibited the basis for the strike 
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. 
We have recognized that these 
determinations of credibility and 
demeanor lie " 'peculiarly within a trial 
judge's province,' "ibid. (quoting 
Wainwrizht v. Witt 469 U.S. 412, 428, 
105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)), 
and we have stated that "in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, we would 
defer to [the trial court]." 500 U.S., at 
366,111 S.Ct. 1859. 
Ill 
[6] Petitioner centers his Batson claim on 
the prosecution's strikes of two black 
jurors, Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott. 
Because we find that the trial court 
committed clear error in overruling 
petitioner's Batson objection with respect 
to Mr. Brooks, we have no need to 
consider petitioner's claim regarding Ms. 
Scott. See, e.g., United States v. 
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Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (C.A.9 
1994) ("[T]he Constitution forbids 
striking even a single prospective juror 
for a discriminatory purpose"); United 
States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (C.A.4 
1989); United States v. demons, 843 
F.2d 741, 747 (C.A.3 1988); United 
States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 
(C.A.8 1987); United States v. David, 803 
F.2dl567, 157UC.A.11 1986). 
£7] In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made 
it clear that in considering a Batson 
objection, or in reviewing a ruling 
claimed to be Batson error, all of the 
circumstances that bear upon the issue of 
racial animosity must be consulted. 545 
U.S., at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Here, as 
just one example, if there were persisting 
doubts as to the outcome, a court would 
be required to consider the strike of Ms. 
Scott for the bearing it might have upon 
the strike of Mr. Brooks. In this case, 
however, the explanation given for the 
strike of Mr. Brooks is by itself 
unconvincing and suffices for the 
determination that there was Batson error. 
When defense counsel made a Batson 
objection concerning the strike of Mr. 
Brooks, a college senior who was 
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching 
obligation, the prosecution offered two 
race-neutral reasons for the strike. The 
prosecutor explained: 
"I thought about it last night. Number 1, 
the main reason is that he looked very 
nervous to me throughout the 
questioning. Number 2, he's one of the 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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fellows that came up at the beginning 
[of voir dire] and said he was going to 
miss class. He's a student teacher. My 
main concern is for that reason, that 
being that he might, to go home quickly, 
come back with guilty of a lesser verdict 
so there wouldn't be a penalty phase. 
Those are my two reasons." App. 444. 
Defense counsel disputed both 
explanations, id., at 444-445, and the trial 
judge ruled as follows: "All right. I'm 
going to allow the challenge. I'm going to 
allow the challenge." Id., at 445. We 
discuss *1209 the prosecution's two 
proffered grounds for striking Mr. Brooks 
in turn. 
A 
With respect to the first reason, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was correct that 
"nervousness cannot be shown from a 
cold transcript, which is why ... the [trial] 
judge's evaluation must be given much 
deference." 942 So.2d, at 496. As noted 
above, deference is especially appropriate 
where a trial judge has made a finding 
that an attorney credibly relied on 
demeanor in exercising a strike. Here, 
however, the record does not show that 
the trial judge actually made a 
determination concerning Mr. Brooks' 
demeanor. The trial judge was given two 
explanations for the strike. Rather than 
making a specific finding on the record 
concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor, the 
trial judge simply allowed the challenge 
without explanation. It is possible that the 
judge did not have any impression one 
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way or the other concerning Mr. Brooks' 
demeanor. Mr. Brooks was not 
challenged until the day after he was 
questioned, and by that time dozens of 
other jurors had been questioned. Thus, 
the trial judge may not have recalled Mr. 
Brooks' demeanor. Or, the trial judge may 
have found it unnecessary to consider Mr. 
Brooks' demeanor, instead basing his 
ruling completely on the second proffered 
justification for the strike. For these 
reasons, we cannot presume that the trial 
judge credited the prosecutor's assertion 
that Mr. Brooks was nervous. 
B 
The second reason proffered for the strike 
of Mr. Brooks-his student-teaching 
obligation-fails even under the highly 
deferential standard of review that is 
applicable here. At the beginning of voir 
dire, when the trial court asked the 
members of the venire whether jury 
service or sequestration would pose an 
extreme hardship, Mr. Brooks was 1 of 
more than 50 members of the venire who 
expressed concern that jury service or 
sequestration would interfere with work, 
school, family, or other obligations. 
When Mr. Brooks came forward, the 
following exchange took place: 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: ... I'm a 
student at Southern University, New 
Orleans. This is my last semester. My 
major requires me to student teach, and 
today I've already missed a half a day. 
That is part of my-it's required for me to 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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graduate this semester. 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. 
Brooks, if you-how many days would 
you miss if you were sequestered on this 
jury? Do you teach every day? 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Five days 
a week. 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five days 
a week. 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: And it's 
8:30 through 3:00. 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you 
missed this week, is there any way that 
you could make it up this semester? 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Well, the 
first two weeks I observe, the remaining 
I begin teaching, so there is something 
I'm missing right now that will better 
me towards my teaching career. 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is there 
any way that you could make up the 
observed observation [sic] that you're 
missing today, at another time? 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: It may be 
possible, I'm not sure. 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So 
that-
"THE COURT: Is there anyone we 
could call, like a Dean or anything, that 
we could speak to? 
*1210 "MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: 
Actually, I spoke to my Dean, Doctor 
Tillman, who's at the university 
probably right now. 
"THE COURT: All right. 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Would 
you like to speak to him? 
"THE COURT: Yeah. 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: I don't 
have his card on me. 
"THE COURT: Why don't you give [a 
law clerk] his number, give [a law 
clerk] his name and we'll call him and 
we'll see what we can do. 
"(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT 
THE BENCH).'5 App. 102-104. 
Shortly thereafter, the court again spoke 
with Mr. Brooks: 
"THE LAW CLERK: Jeffrey Brooks, 
the requirement for his teaching is a 
three hundred clock hour observation. 
Doctor Tillman at Southern University 
said that as long as it's just this week, he 
doesn't see that it would cause a 
problem with Mr. Brooks completing 
his observation time within this 
semester. 
"(MR. BROOKS APPROACHED 
THE BENCH) 
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"THE COURT: We talked to Doctor 
Tillman and he says he doesn't see a 
problem as long as it's just this week, 
you know, he'll work with you on it. 
Okay? 
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Okay. 
"(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT 
THE BENCH)." Id, at 116. 
Once Mr. Brooks heard the law clerk's 
report about the conversation with Doctor 
Tillman, Mr. Brooks did not express any 
further concern about serving on the jury, 
and the prosecution did not choose to 
question him more deeply about this 
matter. 
The colloquy with Mr. Brooks and the 
law clerk's report took place on Tuesday, 
August 27; the prosecution struck Mr. 
Brooks the following day, Wednesday, 
August 28; the guilt phase of petitioner's 
trial ended the next day, Thursday, 
August 29; and the penalty phase was 
completed by the end of the week, on 
Friday, August 30. 
The prosecutor's second proffered reason 
for striking Mr. Brooks must be evaluated 
in light of these circumstances. The 
prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive 
that Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the 
student-teaching hours missed during 
jury service, might have been motivated 
to find petitioner guilty, not of 
first-degree murder, but of a lesser 
included offense because this would 
obviate the need for a penalty phase 
proceeding. But this scenario was highly 
speculative. Even if Mr. Brooks had 
favored a quick resolution, that would not 
have necessarily led him to reject a 
finding of first-degree murder. If the 
majority of jurors had initially favored a 
finding of first-degree murder, Mr. 
Brooks' purported inclination might have 
led him to agree in order to speed the 
deliberations. Only if all or most of the 
other jurors had favored the lesser verdict 
would Mr. Brooks have been in a position 
to shorten the trial by favoring such a 
verdict. 
Perhaps most telling, the brevity of 
petitioner's trial-something that the 
prosecutor anticipated on the record 
during voir dire —-meant that serving on 
the jury would not have seriously 
interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to 
complete his required student teaching. 
As noted, petitioner's trial was completed 
by Friday, August 30. If Mr. Brooks, who 
reported to court and was peremptorily 
challenged *1211 on Wednesday, August 
28, had been permitted to serve, he would 
have missed only two additional days of 
student teaching, Thursday, August 29, 
and Friday, August 30. Mr. Brooks' dean 
promised to "work with" Mr. Brooks to 
see that he was able to make up any 
student-teaching time that he missed due 
to jury service; the dean stated that he did 
not think that this would be a problem; 
and the record contains no suggestion that 
Mr. Brooks remained troubled after 
hearing the report of the dean's remarks. 
In addition, although the record does not 
include the academic calendar of Mr. 
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Brooks' university, it is apparent that the 
trial occurred relatively early in the fall 
semester. With many weeks remaining in 
the term, Mr. Brooks would have needed 
to make up no more than an hour or two 
per week in order to compensate for the 
time that he would have lost due to jury 
service. When all of these considerations 
are taken into account, the prosecutor's 
second proffered justification for striking 
Mr. Brooks is suspicious. 
FN1. See, e.g., App. 98, 105, 111, 
121, 130,204. 
The implausibility of this explanation is 
reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance 
of white jurors who disclosed conflicting 
obligations that appear to have been at 
least as serious as Mr. Brooks'. We 
recognize that a retrospective comparison 
of jurors based on a cold appellate record 
may be very misleading when alleged 
similarities were not raised at trial. In that 
situation, an appellate court must be 
mindful that an exploration of the alleged 
similarities at the time of trial might have 
shown that the jurors in question were not 
really comparable. In this case, however, 
the shared characteristic, i.e., concern 
about serving on the jury due to 
conflicting obligations, was thoroughly 
explored by the trial court when the 
relevant jurors asked to be excused for 
c a u s e d 
FN2. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court did not hold that petitioner 
had procedurally defaulted 
reliance on a comparison of the 
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African-American jurors whom 
the prosecution struck with white 
jurors whom the prosecution 
accepted. On the contrary, the 
State Supreme Court itself made 
such a comparison. See 942 So.2d 
484, 495-496 (20061 
A comparison between Mr. Brooks and 
Roland Laws, a white juror, is 
particularly striking. During the initial 
stage of voir dire, Mr. Laws approached 
the court and offered strong reasons why 
serving on the sequestered jury would 
cause him hardship. Mr. Laws stated that 
he was "a self-employed general 
contractor," with "two houses that are 
nearing completion, one [with the 
occupants] ... moving in this 
weekend." Id., at 129. He explained that, 
if he served on the jury, "the people won't 
[be able to] move in." Id, at 130. Mr. 
Laws also had demanding family 
obligations: 
"[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so 
I'm running the kids back and forth to 
school, and we're not originally from 
here, so I have no family in the area, so 
between the two things, it's kind of bad 
timing for me." Ibid. 
Although these obligations seem 
substantially more pressing than Mr. 
Brooks', the prosecution questioned Mr. 
Laws and attempted to elicit assurances 
that he would be able to serve despite his 
work and family obligations. See ibid. 
(prosecutor asking Mr. Laws "[i]f you got 
stuck on jury duty anyway ... would you 
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try to make other arrangements as best 
you could?"). And the prosecution 
declined the opportunity to use a 
peremptory strike on Mr. Laws. Id., at 
549. If the prosecution had been sincerely 
concerned that Mr. Brooks would favor a 
lesser verdict than first-degree murder in 
order to shorten the trial, it is hard to see 
why the prosecution would not have had 
at least as much concern regarding Mr. 
Laws. 
*1212 The situation regarding another 
white juror, John Donnes, although less 
fully developed, is also significant. At the 
end of the first day of voir dire, Mr. 
Donnes approached the court and raised 
the possibility that he would have an 
important work commitment later that 
week. Id., at 349. Because Mr. Donnes 
stated that he would know the next 
morning whether he would actually have 
a problem, the court suggested that Mr. 
Donnes raise the matter again at that time. 
Ibid. The next day, Mr. Donnes again 
expressed concern about serving, stating 
that, in order to serve, "I'd have to cancel 
too many things," including an urgent 
appointment at which his presence was 
essential. Id., at 467-468. Despite Mr. 
Donnes' concern, the prosecution did not 
strike him. Id., at 490. 
As previously noted, the question 
presented at the third stage of the Batson 
inquiry is " 'whether the defendant has 
shown purposeful discrimination.5 
" Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.. at 277, 
125 S.Ct. 2317. The prosecution's 
proffer of this pretextual explanation 
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naturally gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory intent. See id., at 252, 125 
S.Ct. 2317 (noting the "pretextual 
significance" of a "stated reason [that] 
does not hold up"); Purkett v. Elem% 514 
U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 
L.Ed.2d834fl995)^r curiam) ("At [the 
third] stage, implausible or fantastic 
justifications may (and probably will) be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful 
discrimination"); Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 
365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plurality opinion) 
("In the typical peremptory challenge 
inquiry, the decisive question will be 
whether counsel's race-neutral 
explanation for a peremptory challenge 
should be believed"). Cf. St Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 
511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1993) ("[Rejection of the defendant's 
proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons 
will permit the trier of fact to infer the 
ultimate fact of intentional 
discrimination"). 
In other circumstances, we have held that, 
once it is shown that a discriminatory 
intent was a substantial or motivating 
factor in an action taken by a state actor, 
the burden shifts to the party defending 
the action to show that this factor was not 
determinative. See Hunter v. Underwood, 
All U.S. 222, 228, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). We have not 
previously applied this rule in a Batson 
case, and we need not decide here 
whether that standard governs in this 
context. For present purposes, it is 
enough to recognize that a peremptory 
strike shown to have been motivated in 
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substantial part by discriminatory intent 
could not be sustained based on any lesser 
showing by the prosecution. And in light 
of the circumstances here-including 
absence of anything in the record 
showing that the trial judge credited the 
claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the 
prosecution's description of both of its 
proffered explanations as "main 
concern[s]," App. 444, and the adverse 
inference noted above-the record does not 
show that the prosecution would have 
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks 
based on his nervousness alone. See 
Hunter, supra, at 228, 105 S.Ct. 
1916. Nor is there any realistic 
possibility that this subtle question of 
causation could be profitably explored 
further on remand at this late date, more 
than a decade after petitioner's trial. 
* * * 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and remand the 
case for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice 
SCALIA joins, dissenting. 
Petitioner essentially asks this Court to 
second-guess the fact-based 
determinations*1213 of the Louisiana 
courts as to the reasons for a prosecutor's 
decision to strike two jurors. The 
evaluation of a prosecutor's motives for 
striking a juror is at bottom a credibility 
judgment, which lies " ' peculiarly within 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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a trial judge's province.' " Hernandez v. 
New York 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 
1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 
841 (1985)); Hernandez, supra, at 372, 
111 S.Ct. 1859 (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in judgment); ante, at 1208."[I]n the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, we 
[should] defer to state-court factual 
findings." Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 366, 
111 S.Ct. 1859. None of the evidence in 
the record as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and 
Elaine Scott demonstrates that the trial 
court clearly erred in finding they were 
not stricken on the basis of race. Because 
the trial court's determination was a 
"permissible view of the evidence," id., 
at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859,1 would affirm the 
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. 
The Court begins by setting out the 
"deferential standard," ante, at 1209, that 
we apply to a trial court's resolution of a 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), claim, 
noting that we will overturn a ruling on 
the question of discriminatory intent only 
if it is "clearly erroneous," ante, at 
1208.Under this standard, we "will not 
reverse a lower court's finding of fact 
simply because we would have decided 
the case differently." Easley v. 
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 
1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Instead, a 
reviewing court must ask "whether, 'on 
the entire evidence,' it is 'left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a 
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mistake has been committed.' " Ibid. 
(quoting United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct 
525, 92 L.Ed. 746(1948)). 
The Court acknowledges two reasons 
why a trial court "has a pivotal role in 
evaluating Batson claims." Ante, at 
1208.First, the Court notes that the trial 
court is uniquely situated to judge the 
prosecutor's credibility because the best 
evidence of discriminatory intent" 'often 
will be the demeanor of the attorney who 
exercises the challenge.' " Ibid, (quoting 
Hernandez, supra, at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 
(plurality opinion)). Second, it recognizes 
that the trial court's "first-hand 
observations" of the juror's demeanor are 
of "grea[t] importance" in determining 
whether the prosecutor's neutral basis for 
the strike is credible. Ante, at 1208. 
The Court's conclusion, however, reveals 
that it is only paying lipservice to the 
pivotal role of the trial court. The Court 
second-guesses the trial court's 
determinations in this case merely 
because the judge did not clarify which of 
the prosecutor's neutral bases for striking 
Mr. Brooks was dispositive. But we have 
never suggested that a reviewing court 
should defer to a trial court's resolution of 
a Batson challenge only if the trial court 
made specific findings with respect to 
each of the prosecutor's proffered 
race-neutral reasons. To the contrary, 
when the grounds for a trial court's 
decision are ambiguous, an appellate 
court should not presume that the lower 
court based its decision on an improper 
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ground, particularly when applying a 
deferential standard of review. See 
Sprint/United Management Co. v. 
Mendelsohn, — U.S. —-„ 128 S.Ct. 1140, 
1145, 170 L.Ed.2dl. 
The prosecution offered two neutral bases 
for striking Mr. Brooks: his nervous 
demeanor and his stated concern about 
missing class. App. 444. The trial court, 
in rejecting defendant's Batson challenge, 
stated only "All right. I'm going to allow 
the challenge. I'm going to allow the 
challenge."*1214 Id, at 445. The Court 
concedes that "the record does not show" 
whether the trial court made its 
determination based on Mr. Brooks' 
demeanor or his concern for missing 
class, ante, at 1209, but then speculates as 
to what the trial court might have thought 
about Mr. Brooks' demeanor. As a result 
of that speculation, the Court concludes 
that it "cannot presume that the trial court 
credited the prosecutor's assertion that 
Mr. Brooks was nervous." Ibid. 
Inexplicably, however, the Court 
concludes that it can presume that the 
trial court impermissibly relied on the 
prosecutor's supposedly pretextual 
concern about Mr. Brooks' teaching 
schedule, even though nothing in the 
record supports that interpretation over 
the one the Court rejects. 
Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it 
is that the judge was more influenced by 
Mr. Brooks' nervousness than by his 
concern for missing class. Following an 
exchange about whether his desire to get 
back to class would make Mr. Brooks 
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more likely to support a verdict on a 
lesser included offense because it might 
avoid a penalty phase, defense counsel 
offered its primary rebuttal to the 
prosecutor's proffered neutral reasons. 
Immediately after argument on the 
nervousness point, the judge ruled on the 
Baison challenge, even interrupting the 
prosecutor to do so: 
"MR. VASQUEZ: His main problem 
yesterday was the fact that he didn't 
know if he would miss some teaching 
time as a student teacher. The clerk 
called the school and whoever it was 
and the Dean said that wouldn't be a 
problem. He was told that this would go 
through the weekend, and he expressed 
that that was his only concern, that he 
didn't have any other problems. 
"As far as him looking nervous, hell, 
everybody out here looks nervous. I'm 
nervous. 
"MR. OLINDE: Judge, it's-
"MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that's-You 
know. 
"MR. OLINDE:-a question of this: It's a 
peremptory challenge. We need 12 out 
of 12 people. Mr. Brooks was very 
uncertain and very nervous looking 
and-
"THE COURT: All right. I'm going to 
allow the challenge. I'm going to allow 
the challenge." App. 445. 
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Although this exchange is certainly not 
hard-and-fast evidence of the trial court's 
reasoning, it undermines the Court's 
presumption that the trial judge relied 
solely on Mr. Brooks' concern for missing 
school. 
The Court also concludes that the trial 
court's determination lacked support in 
the record because the prosecutor failed 
to strike two other jurors with similar 
concerns. Ante, at 1211 - 1212. Those 
jurors, however, were never mentioned in 
the argument before the trial court, nor 
were they discussed in the filings or 
opinions on any of the three occasions 
this case was considered by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. — Petitioner failed to 
suggest a comparison with those two 
jurors in his petition for certiorari, and 
apparently only discovered this "clear 
error" in the record when drafting his 
brief before this Court. We have no 
business overturning a conviction, years 
after the fact and after extensive 
intervening litigation, based on 
arguments not presented to the courts 
below. Cf. *V115Miller-Elv. Dretke, 545 
U.S. 23L 283. 125 S.Ct. 2317. 162 
L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (THOMAS, J., 
dissenting). 
FN* While the Court correctly 
observes that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court made a 
comparison between Mr. Brooks 
and unstricken white jurors, that is 
true only as to jurors Vicki 
Chauffe, Michael Sandras, and 
Arthur Yeager. 1998-1078 
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(La.9/6/06), 942 So.2d 484. 
495-496. The Court, on the other 
hand, focuses on Roland Laws and 
John Donnes, who were never 
discussed below in this context. 
Because I believe that the trial court did 
not clearly err in rejecting petitioner's 
Batson challenge with respect to Mr. 
Brooks, I also must address the strike of 
Ms. Scott. The prosecution's neutral 
explanation for striking Ms. Scott was 
that she was unsure about her ability to 
impose the death penalty. Like the claims 
made about Mr. Brooks, there is very 
little in the record either to support or to 
undermine the prosecution's asserted 
rationale for striking Ms. Scott. But the 
trial court had the benefit of observing the 
exchange between the prosecutor and Ms. 
Scott, and accordingly was in the best 
position to judge whether the prosecutor's 
assessment of her response was credible. 
When asked if she could consider the 
death penalty, her first response was 
inaudible. App. 360. The trial court, with 
the benefit of contextual clues not 
apparent on a cold transcript, was better 
positioned to evaluate whether Ms. Scott 
was merely softspoken or seemed hesitant 
in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand 
observation of demeanor is the only thing 
that could give sufficient content to Ms. 
Scott's ultimate response-"I think I 
could," id, at 361-to determine whether 
the prosecution's concern about her 
willingness to impose the death penalty 
was well founded. Given the trial court's 
expertise in making credibility 
determinations and its firsthand 
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knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it 
is entirely proper to defer to its judgment. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment 
below. 
U.S.La.,2008. 
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